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THE RISE OF THE EXTREME RIGHT AND THE 
CRIME OF TERRORISM: IDEOLOGY, 
MOBILIZATION, AND THE CASE OF GOLDEN 
DAWN 
 
NADIA BANTEKA* 
The past decade has witnessed the rise in popularity of organizations 
and political parties founded on the extreme nationalism and populism that 
characterized the interwar period’s fascist and Nazi parties. These 
organizations have become known as the “alt-right” and include white 
supremacists, neo-Nazis, neo-fascists, and other extreme right-wing fringe 
groups.  Extreme right-wing political parties have also enjoyed electoral 
victories while promulgating xenophobia and hatred based on race, religion, 
ethnicity, nationality, and sexual orientation.  This article examines the 
resurgence of such extreme right-wing political parties and the relationship 
between right-wing extremism, political parties, and terrorism.  The goal of 
this article is to shift the discussion from one of political analysis of right-
wing extremism to one of legal evaluation of the activities involved within 
the ambit of the recent advances in the criminalization of terrorism. Could 
the mobilization of extreme right-wing political parties be classified as 
terrorism?  This article begins to answer this question by assessing the 
definitional problem of terrorism and critically analyzing the most recent 
legislative developments in the EU.  The article focuses on the uneasy 
relationship between the legal nature of political parties and the crime of 
terrorism.  It then applies insights from this debate to the specific case of 
Greece’s popular extreme right-wing political party: Golden Dawn.  It 
discusses Golden Dawn’s development and political mobilization under the 
framework of terrorist statutes and argues in favor of a constitutional 
interpretation that gives political parties the necessary legal personality in 
order to incur collective criminal liability for such activities. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The past decade has been marked by a steep revival and increased 
popularity across the globe of organizations and political parties founded on 
ideals rooted in the extreme nationalism and populism that characterized the 
interwar period’s fascist and Nazi parties.  The United Nations Secretary- 
General underlined that neo-fascism and neo-Nazism are gaining ground in 
many countries especially in Europe.1 The “electoral victories of extreme 
right parties advocating xenophobia, attacks on ethnic, national and religious 
minorities, and racial or ethnic purity in the countries where they are active” 
demonstrate this trend.2  Most recently, the US has witnessed a similar re-
energization of groups that make up what has become known as the “alt-
right” and include white supremacists, neo-Nazis, neo-fascists, and other 
extreme right-wing fringe groups.3 
The sudden popularity of these parties within local or national 
government coupled with the varied and self-selective terminology used to 
 
 1. Press Release, Secretary-General, at Second World War Exhibition, Calls Resurgent Nazi 
Ideologies ‘Cancer That Is Starting to Spread Again’, Stressing ‘Duty’ of Defeating Them, U.N. Press 
Release SG/SM/19024 (May 9, 2018). 
 2. Hans-Georg Betz, The Growing Threat of the Radical Right, in RIGHT-WING EXTREMISM IN 
THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 76 (Peter H. Merkel & Leonard Weinberg eds., 2003). See also A. James 
Gregor, Fascism’s Philosophy of Violence and the Concept of Terror, in THE MORALITY OF TERRORISM 
153–65 (David C. Rapport & Yona Alexander eds., 1982) (describing the violent terrorism committed by 
various fascist groups in the twentieth century). 
 3. Liam Stack, Alt-Right, Alt-Left, Antifa: A Glossary of Extremist Language, N.Y. TIMES, (Aug. 
15, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/15/us/politics/alt-left-alt-right-glossary. “The ‘alt-right’ is 
a racist, far-right movement based on an ideology of white nationalism and anti-Semitism; “Alt-
Right, THE SOUTHERN POVERTY L. CTR, https://www.splcenter.org/fighting-hate/extremist-
files/ideology/alt-right. (last visited Feb. 10, 2018). “The Alternative Right, commonly known as the ‘alt-
right,’ is a set of far-right ideologies, groups and individuals whose core belief is that ‘white identity’ is 
under attack by multicultural forces using ‘political correctness’ and ‘social justice’ to undermine white 
people and ‘their’ civilization.” 
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describe, classify, and define them have caused confusion around these 
political units’ identities and the nature of the general political phenomenon 
of which they are a part.  Terms ranging from extreme, far, and radical right, 
to populist, nationalist, neo-Nazi, neo-fascist, and alt-right have been used 
interchangeably by the organizations and political parties themselves, as well 
as by the national constituencies and the media.4  This terminology, however, 
is somewhat disorienting.  The terms that attach to a political left-right 
continuum are situational considering that politically “left” and “right” may 
vary from country to country and include issues and trends that even 
transcend the left-right binary itself.5  The alternative labels of fascism, 
nationalism, and Nazism, are arguably too narrow to encompass the wide 
array of movements that fall within the spectrum and are perhaps even 
outdated.6  Finally, the alternative concept of ‘hate parties’ in reference to 
‘hate crime’ isolates the criminal aspect of the phenomenon from the 
potentially wider political context of non-criminal activities.7 
This article examines the resurgence of the extreme right-wing political 
parties in Europe in general and Greece in particular as well as the 
relationship between right-wing extremism, political parties, and terrorism.  
The first part of this article explores historical and terminological nuances of 
right-wing extremism and argues that right-wing extremism is the product of 
a delegitimization process against the political status quo.  It further contends 
that these new political parties, founded on interwar extreme right 
ideologies, are different in their rhetoric and approach towards representative 
democracy than their predecessors, making them fundamentally more 
threatening to the liberal state.  Then, the article moves on to analyze the 
potential of these parties’ activities to qualify as terrorist activities.  To 
achieve this end, the article presents the definitional problem of terrorism 
internationally as well as in the European Union (EU) and critically analyzes 
the most recent EU Directive on combatting terrorism and its contested 
endangerment requirement.  The second part of this article focuses on the 
uneasy relationship between established political parties and the crime of 
terrorism.  It applies this debate to the specific case of Greece’s popular 
 
 4. Jim Wolfreys, The European Extreme Right in Comparative Perspective, in VARIETIES OF 
RIGHT-WING EXTREMISM IN EUROPE 19, 19 (Andrea Mammone et al. ed., 2013). 
 5.  JONATHAN WHITE, LEFT, RIGHT AND BEYOND: THE PRAGMATICS OF POLITICAL MAPPING, in 
LSE ‘EUROPE IN QUESTION’ DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES, 2010 5–6 (LEQS Paper No. 24, 2010). 
 6.  See ROGER GRIFFIN, THE NATURE OF FASCISM (1991); Gilbert Allardyce, What Fascism is Not: 
Thoughts on the Deflation of a Concept, 84 AMERICAN HISTORICAL REVIEW 367, 367–89 (1979); 
FASCISTS AND CONSERVATIVES (Martin Blinkhorn ed., 1990); RENZO DE FELICE, FASCISM (1976); 
RENZO DE FELICE, INTERPRETATIONS OF FASCISM (Brenda H. Everett trans., 1977); FASCISM IN EUROPE 
(S.J. Woolf ed., 1981). 
 7. TERROR FROM THE EXTREME RIGHT (Tore Bjørgo ed., 1995). 
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extreme right-wing political party: Golden Dawn. The article discusses 
Golden Dawn’s development and political mobilization in relation to 
terrorist statutes transposing the recent EU Directive into domestic law and 
argues in favor of a constitutional interpretation that gives political parties 
the necessary legal personality in order to incur collective criminal liability 
for terrorist activities. 
PART I 
A. The History and Political Ideology of Extreme Right-Wing Parties 
Wilhem Heitmeyer describes right-wing extremism as an ideology 
rooted in the assertion of a natural inequality between people, coupled with 
recognition of violence as a legitimate archetype for political action.8  For 
the purposes of this article and for reasons of efficiency, I use the term 
“extreme right” as comprising political ideology, activist policies, and the 
potentially violent and criminal activity that attach to the extreme right of the 
political spectrum.9  One of the modern forms of terrorism is the particular 
kind of terrorism produced by right-wing movements adhering to the 
politically ideological schools of fascism and Nazism.10  Between the 1920’s 
and 1940’s, Europe witnessed an insurgence of such movements with the 
Italian fascists and German Nazis succeeding in taking official governmental 
power and control over their countries.11 The fascist and Nazi leaders and 
ideologues exalted the use of violence as an integral element of governance, 
a kind of violence that quickly converted into a form of massive terrorism 
that was both targeted and indiscriminate.12  The prewar and interwar fascist 
and Nazi parties felt little need to justify the use of violence to their 
constituencies. Violence instead was understood and preached as an intrinsic 
element of the fascist and Nazi Weltanschauung, or worldview, making it 
equally self-evident and necessary, requiring no explanation or 
 
 8. Wilhem Heitmeyer, Right-Wing Extremist Violence, in INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK OF 
VIOLENCE RESEARCH 399, 399–436 (Wilhelm Heitmeyer & John Haganeds., 2003); Wilhem Heitmeyer, 
Right-wing terrorism, in ROOT CAUSES OF TERRORISM 141, 141–53 Tore Bjørgo ed., 2005); see also 
Hans-Georg Betz, The Growing Thread of the Radical Right, in RIGHT-WING EXTREMISM IN THE 
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 74, 74 (Peter H. Merkel & Leonard Weinberg eds., 2003). 
 9. See Tore Bjørgo, Introduction, in TERROR FROM THE EXTREME RIGHT 1, 1–13 (Tore Bjørgo 
ed., 1995). 
 10. See Ehud Sprinzak, RightWing Terrorism in a Comparative Perspective: The Case of Split 
Delegitimization 7(1) TERRORISM AND POLITICAL VIOLENCE 17, 17–43 (2007) (analyzing the unique 
characteristics of right-wing terrorism). 
 11. Id. at 23. 
 12. PETER MERKL, THE MAKING OF A STORMTROOPER 299–305 (1987); ERNST NOLTE, THREE 
FACES OF FASCISM 260–63 (1965). 
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justification.13 Additionally, their politically and territorially expansive 
agendas created “satellite” parties and organizations across Europe, which, 
akin to their original counterparts, adopted violence as an essential part of 
their political ideology.14 
In order to fully understand the current resurgence of the extreme right 
in Europe and beyond, it is important to address its ideological foundation.  
Ideology represents “a conceptual frame of reference, which provides 
criteria for choice and decision by virtue of which the major activities of an 
organized community are governed.”15  All ideologies rely on political 
axioms for the provision of a conceptual foundation consisting of ideals held 
to be self-evident to its adherents.16  Fascism and Nazism are ideologies that 
were generated on political axioms in direct opposition to democratic ones 
and essentially developed as polemical forms of anti-ideologies.  They 
developed as a reaction to the modern democratic creed that was based on 
liberal individualism and constitutionalism. Fascism and Nazism arrived on 
the political scene at a time when liberal democracy was experiencing its 
first difficulties and its political parties were seen as dismissive of issues that 
certain social groups considered of high importance, often relating to 
financial crises, corruption, immigration, and social inclusion.17  The fascist 
and Nazi ideologies grew from these circumstances rather than a set of 
preceding ideas, owing their appeal to action and mobilization instead of 
political doctrine and dogma.18  It is therefore helpful to depart from the 
traditional doctrinal approaches to fully comprehend and analyze the ways 
in which these political formations function.  Instead, we should approach 
them with both the circumstantial context of each era in which they came 
 
 13. See Betz, supra note 2, at 74–89 (describing the worldview of modern fascist parties). 
 14. See MARK MAZOWER, HITLER’S EMPIRE: HOW THE NAZIS RULED EUROPE 137–78 (2008) 
(describing Hitler’s occupation of eastern Europe). 
 15. HERBERT KITSCHELT in collaboration with ANTHONY J. MCGANN, THE RADICAL RIGHT IN 
WESTERN EUROPE: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 29 (The Univ. of Mich. Press, 1995) citing ZEER 
STERNHELL, Fascist Ideology, in FASCISM. A READER’S GUIDE 326 (Walter Laqueur ed.s, 1976). 
 16. Meindert Fennema, Populist Parties of the Right, in MOVEMENTS OF EXCLUSION: RADICAL 
RIGHT-WING POPULISM IN THE WESTERN WORLD 1, 4 (Jens Rydgren ed., 2005). The political axiom of 
the democratic ideology is well expressed in the American Declaration of Independence which claims 
that “all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights”. 
The fact that this is indeed a political axiom is shown in the outset of the sentence “we hold these truths 
to be self-evident.” THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, para. 2 (U.S. 1776). 
 17. See P. Papasarantopoulos, To big bang ths Xrysh Avgis [Golden Dawn’s big bang] 23 THE 
BOOKS’ J. 12–19 (2012). 
 18. ROBERT O. PAXTON, THE ANATOMY OF FASCISM 17 (2005). As Mussolini put it: “the 
Democrats of Il Mondo want to know our program? It is to break the bones of the Democrats of Il Mondo. 
And the sooner the better”. 
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into being as well as the axiomatic sociopolitical references these political 
entities have manifested.19 
For the fascists and Nazis, social inequality forms the cornerstone of a 
political ideology that legitimizes itself by reference to nature.  Starting from 
the endogenous hierarchical nature of the existing society, these political 
entities point to the “natural” plausibility of inborn differences between 
people, instilling the social fact of societal inequality with a “moral” 
significance and a sense of ultimate efficacy.20  The theorists of fascism and 
Nazism identify four overarching themes in the parties’ doctrines: (1) ethnic 
nationalism; (2) anti-materialism; (3) anti-parliamentarism; and (4) 
conspiracy theory.21  First, stemming from the natural causes of inherent 
social inequality, “the nation” is no longer defined in political terms.  Instead, 
it becomes a metaphysical conception of a nation tied to a biological bond 
and prescribes that only those who biologically belong to a certain ethnic 
community form part of it.22  Membership is restricted to jus sanguinis and 
expressed both in terms of blood and culture.23 
Second, anti-materialism developed opposite to the individualist 
materialist culture that flourished in 18th century writings.24  Fascist and 
Nazi anti-material dogma attacks liberalism for advocating the pursuit of 
individual interest and fragmenting society, and critiques Marxism for its 
insistence on class warfare, as it may lead to national destruction.25  
Attacking both the rational choice of liberalism and the egalitarian 
propositions of Marxism, Nazism and fascism created a political doctrine of 
‘socialist nationalism’ in which the individual is subordinate to the people 
who form the nation.26  For reasons that draw from both the ethnic nationalist 
and anti-material positions, fascism and Nazism stand in direct opposition to 
 
 19. See Wolfreys, supra note 4, at 19–34 (taking a comparative view of differing extreme right 
parties). 
 20. Fennema, supra note 16, at 4. “By rejecting the authority of the individual and replacing it by 
the numbers of some momentary mob, the parliamentary principle of majority rule sins against the basic 
aristocratic principle of Nature, though it must be said that this view is not necessarily embodied in the 
present-day decadence of our upper ten thousand.” ADOLF HITLER, MEIN KAMPF, vol. 1, ch. 3 (trans.) 
(1943), http://www.hitler.org/writings/ Mein_Kampf/mkv1ch03.html. 
 21. Fennema, supra note 16, at 5. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Zeev Sternhell, The ‘Anti-materialist’ Revision of Marxism as an Aspect of the Rise of Fascist 
Ideology, 22 J.  CONTEMP. HIST. 379, 392 (1987). 
 25. B. MUSSOLINI, LA DOCTRINE DU FASCISME 67 (1952). 
 26. See KITSCHELT, supra note 15, at 29 (“Fascism opposed the dominance of markets and 
bureaucracy and instead advocated an authoritarian, hierarchical, and communitarian order under 
leadership of charismatic individuals.”); Fennema, supra note 16, at 5 (describing ethnic, or cultural, 
nationalism in fascist ideology). 
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liberal democracy. They attack what they consider to be the “elitist” nature 
of the representational system and view majority rule as a futile attempt to 
shield the individual from political responsibility.  Partisan political classes 
in democracies represent egotistic and self-interested entities prone to 
corruption. Instead, these parties and their adherents advocate for a ‘true 
democracy,’ the kind that is launched in the direct name of the people by the 
people.27 
Finally, under a heavy populist discourse, these ideologies claim that 
there is an international conspiracy against the nation from both internal and 
external enemies that interchangeably take the face of all that is foreign and 
alien to the nation.28 According to these ideologies, these enemies attack the 
well-being, health, and survival of the nation, therefore endangering its 
“biological” future.29  Issues such as low birth rates, abortion, contraception, 
economic dearth, as well as less conventional forms of interpersonal 
relationships such as homosexuality, singleness, and feminism, suddenly 
become threatening because they cap the ability of the nation to grow in 
numbers.30  The external threat comes from immigration.  These ideologies 
are premised on a high degree of national homogeneity and base their 
political claims on emphasizing the nation’s differences and superiority to 
other nations.31  They usually derive from a shared biological or cultural 
heritage and historic past, something that immigrants do not have in common 
with the nation therefore threatening national cohesion.  Immigrants are seen 
as outsiders, a population within society that is foreign to the nation, and 
which, just like a ‘foreign body,’ penetrates the homogenous social body 
threatening its health and balance.32  And because, for these ideologies and 
 
 27. See Jérôme Jamin, Two Different Realities: Notes on Populism and the Extreme Right, in 
VARIETIES OF RIGHT-WING EXTREMISM IN EUROPE 38, 40–46 (Andrea Mammone, Emanuel Godin et al. 
ed., Routledge, 2012) (defining populism and nationalism on the extreme right).  
 28. See Fennema, supra note 16, at 7–8 (describing the prevalence of conspiracy theories in fascist 
ideologies). 
 29. BEYERCHEN, A. D. SCIENTISTS UNDER HITLER (Ya1e Univ. Press, 1977); Falger, V. S. E., 
Sociobiology and political ideology: Comments on the radical point of view, J. HUM. EVOL. 129, 129–35 
(1984); GASMAN, D. THE SCIENTIFIC ORIGINS OF NATIONAL SOCIALISM. (1971); ZMARZLIK, H.-
G.SOCIAL DARWINISM IN GERMANY SEEN AS A HISTORICAL PROBLEM (1972); George J. Stein, Biological 
Science and the Roots of Nazism: The Promotion of Racist Doctrines in the Name of Science, 76 AM. SCI. 
50, 50–8 (1988). 
 30. Jamin, supra note 27, at 46. 
 31. E.G.T. Green, O. Sarrasin, N. Fasel & C. Staerklé, Nationalism and Patriotism as Predictors of 
Immigration Attitudes in Switzerland: A Municipality-level Analysis 17(4) SWISS POL. SCI. REV. 369, 370 
(2011). 
 32. See Jens Rydgren & Joop van Holsteyn, Holland and Pim Fortuyn: A Deviant Case or the 
Beginning of Something New?, in MOVEMENTS OF EXCLUSION: RADICAL RIGHT-WING POPULISM IN THE 
WESTERN WORLD 41, 46 (Jens Rydgren ed., 2005) (describing the effect of concerns about asylum 
seekers and other perceived outsiders on politics in the Netherlands); T. Blank, P. Schmidt, National 
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their adherents, the democratic political system is technically incompetent 
and morally corrupt, it is unable to protect the nation from those enemies.  
By claiming that they will solve the problems that the present indirect 
democracy is unable to solve by introducing a more direct and hands-on kind 
of democracy, these extreme right wing parties are able to infiltrate the social 
web.33 
While ideology and doctrine were an important part of the development 
of fascist and Nazi movements, these movements also derived a large part of 
their appeal from emotion that grew out of their symbols, rituals, rallies, 
culture of violence and voluntarism.34  However, movements are not static 
phenomena, but instead develop and morph over time and in reaction to the 
particular constituencies they pledge to serve.35  From the mid 20th century 
through the past decades, these movements have undertaken a significant 
constructivist turn in their public discourse and stance towards democracy.  
Current political parties that embrace openly or implicitly the ideological 
positions and axioms of fascism and Nazism largely refrain from 
systematically attacking parliamentary democracy and focus their ferocious 
critique on the individually elected representatives instead.36  Rather than 
rejecting democracy wholesale, these parties push the claim that they are 
more democratic than the present political establishment and therefore will 
not hinder democracy but will enhance it.  The next section explores exactly 
how these new political parties identify and position themselves in relation 
to the existing democratic establishment. 
B. The Rise of New Extreme Right-Wing Parties and Political 
Delegitimization 
Mainstream political parties tend to quickly dismiss the emerging 
extreme right as ‘fascist,’ indirectly suggesting that they lack legitimacy by 
 
Identity in a United Germany: Nationalism or Patriotism? An Empirical Test with Representative Data, 
POL. PSYCHOL. (2003) (for an empirical connection between nationalism and immigration); M. 
COENDERS & P. SCHEEPERS, ASSOCIATIONS BETWEEN NATIONALIST ATTITUDES AND EXCLUSIONIST 
REACTIONS IN 22 COUNTRIES (2004). 
 33. See Rydgren & van Holsteyn, supra note 20, at 46 (describing the political rise of the far right 
in the Netherlands). 
 34. WOLFREYS, supra note 4, at 21; DONATELLA DELLA PORTA, CLANDESTINE POLITICAL 
VIOLENCE (2013); Jeff Goodwin, Review Essays: What Must We Explain to Explain Terrorism? 3 SOC. 
MOVEMENT STUD. 259, 259–65 (2004). 
 35. See generally LUCIANO CHELES, NEO-FASCISM IN EUROPE (1991); WALTER LAQUEUR, 
FASCISM: PAST, PRESENT, FUTURE (1996); MARTIN A. LEE, THE BEAST REAWAKENS: FASCISM’S 
RESURGENCE FROM HITLER’S SPYMASTERS TO TODAY’S NEO-NAZI GROUPS AND RIGHT-WING 
EXTREMISTS (1999). For a dissenting position, see DIETHELM PROWE, FASCISM, NEW-FASCISM, NEW 
RADICAL RIGHT 305–24 (R. Griffin ed., 1998). 
 36. Fennema, supra note 16, at 8. 
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default.  There is a strong temptation to equate this new wave of extreme 
right with the old version of the fascist and Nazi parties from the 1930s and 
40s.37  However, I argue that, although that view is intuitively appealing, 
under closer examination, the new extreme right parties are distinct from the 
old ones.  This is, in part, due to the circumstances within which they have 
evolved and around which they constructed their political discourse in order 
to gain popularity and legitimacy. 
Recent advances in our interpretation of those extreme right-wing 
movements suggest that they wish to be understood as a radical form of 
nationalism, which is aimed at mobilizing national resources towards 
rehabilitating the vulnerable and at times decayed state.38  The traditional 
fascist and Nazi regimes of the 1922–1945 period were movements that 
derived their identity from essentially being “anti-movements”: anti-
liberalist, anti-democratic, anti-communist, anti-capitalist, anti-bourgeois.39  
Although the new extreme right continues to be anti-bourgeois, the rise of 
the middle class in Europe and increased global interconnectedness have 
shifted its polemic antipathy from the bourgeoisie, now a social minority, to 
those that constitute “alien” parts of the society: immigrants and refugees, 
especially those coming from different ethnic and racial backgrounds.  When 
juxtaposed with traditional fascist and Nazi parties, the most prominent 
characteristic of the new extreme right parties is their espousal of 
ethnopluralist notions of cultural protectionism, which is founded on ideas 
of national purity and incompatibility of intercultural mixing.40  Though 
among the contemporary extreme right parties one may still be able to 
identify splinter groups that are vocally hostile to liberal and parliamentary 
democracy, the majority is not openly anti-democratic.  On the contrary, they 
actively embrace in their popular rhetoric the democratic liberal system and 
engage with it both in terms of participation, as well as by seizing the 
resources it provides, and by attempting to play by the rules of the pre-
established game.41  Nonetheless, these parties strongly express, at least 
implicitly, anti-systemic ideas and attitudes and can be described as anti-
 
 37. Betz, supra note 2, at 76. 
 38. See Interview with C. Bouchet, Far-Right Journalist, Open Revolt! (Aug. 14, 2011) (discussing 
the beliefs and aims of revolutionary nationalism). 
 39. Michael Minkenberg, The Renewal of the Radical Right: Between Modernity and Anti-
Modernity, 35 GOV’T AND OPPOSITION 170, 180 (2000). 
 40. See Sprinzak, supra note 10, at 23–25 (summarizing the evolution of the extreme right since the 
early twentieth century). 
 41. See Jamin, supra note 27, at 46–47 (describing the common analysis of the extreme right as 
being “anti-X, anti-Y, etc.”). 
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egalitarian and anti-pluralist, and therefore are fundamentally opposed to the 
founding principles of the democratic political system.42 
Extremist political organizations and parties usually develop in social 
conditions that fuel the delegitimization of the political status quo.43  While 
the specifics of this process may vary between countries and across time, it 
typically involves three consecutive stages: (1) a crisis of confidence; (2) a 
conflict of legitimacy; (3) and a crisis of legitimacy.44  Each of these stages 
refers to the relationship cultivated between a certain political organization 
and its followers, both individually as well as collectively vis-a-vis the 
established political regime. The delegitimization process affects the identity 
of the group, which is usually made of ideological, behavioral, and 
psychological components.45 
Political delegitimization begins with a crisis of confidence, which is 
the earliest and most moderate stage of group radicalization.  In this stage, a 
certain group begins to lose confidence in the governmental structure, 
leading to a conflict with specific rules and policies adopted or implemented 
by the government.  The crisis of confidence occurs when the ideological 
discrepancies between the structure and the agent, in this case the political 
status quo and the group, rise to such a level that the group no longer feels 
comfortable abiding by the rules of the system.46  This gives rise to a critique 
of the establishment in ideological pronouncements, symbolic resistance, 
and provocative – often even illegal – language and action.47  The process of 
radicalization continues with a conflict of legitimacy, which involves the 
emergence of a different ideological system designed to prevail over the 
present structure as an alternative.  This is done in the name of improving 
the political system and benefiting society, while manifesting itself through 
intense political action ranging from fierce demonstrations and protests to 
 
 42. Ehud Sprinzak, The Psychopolitical Formation of Extreme Left Terrorism in a Democracy: The 
Case of the Weathermen, in ORIGINS OF TERRORISM 79 (Walter Reich ed., Cambridge University Press, 
1990). 
 43. See id. at 78 (arguing that terrorism is “the behavioral product of a prolonged process of 
delegitimization of the established society or the regime”). 
 44. Ehud Sprinzak, The Process of Delegitimization: Towards a Linkage Theory of Political 
Terrorism, 3 TERRORISM AND POL. VIOLENCE 50, 54–55 (1991). 
 45. See id. at 56 (“The evolution of the conflict of legitimacy is not marked by ideological, symbolic 
and psychological changes only. It is equally manifested by intense political action that ranges between 
angry protest (demonstrations, confrontations, and vandalism) and the application of small scale 
intentional violence against the regime.”). 
 46. See Fouad Bou Zeineddine & Felicia Pratto, Political distrust: the seed and fruit of popular 
empowerment, in POWER, POLITICS, AND PARANOIA: WHY PEOPLE ARE SUSPICIOUS OF THEIR LEADERS 
106, 113 (Jan-Willem van Prooijen & Paul A.M. van Lange eds., 2014) (discussing the delegitimization 
of hierarchical structures). 
 47. See Sprinzak, supra note 42, at 66 (citing the pronouncements of the small radical group ‘the 
Weathermen’). 
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low-scale scattered violence.48 Finally, in the last stage of the 
delegitimization process, the previous two stages culminate with the conflict 
morphing into a crisis of legitimacy.  Here, the entire social order, including 
the individual agents comprising it, is depersonalized and dehumanized by 
the group.  It is considered corrupt, immoral, and incapable of representing 
and efficiently governing, therefore becoming the enemy of the adherents of 
that certain group.49  Both the government as well as those that it appears to 
be protecting, shielding, or simply not appropriately handling, are derogated 
to a lower level of personhood, which makes them susceptible to becoming 
targets of extreme violence.  The group then focuses its efforts towards 
ridding society of what it considers to be a rotten regime and all the ills the 
regime has failed to fix through systematic, unconventional attacks against 
them.50 
This delegitimization process reflects the way extreme right-wing 
organizations and parties emerge and develop.  In political systems that have 
reached the second or the third stage of the delegitimization process wherein 
these groups have increased popularity, they usually resort to sui generis 
forms of vigilante terrorism against both the political status quo and most 
importantly the individuals and groups that they consider a threat to society.  
These vigilantes begin to fight private wars against these individuals and 
groups, incorporating a form of particularistic terrorism that does not 
undermine the regime as a universal structure but instead attacks those 
individual components of it that form part of the radical group’s polemic 
agenda.51  They therefore fight private wars against immigrants, racial, 
ethnic, and religious minorities, homosexuals, communists, corrupt 
politicians, and all classes of people they consider ‘inferior’ to the nation that 
they are trying to protect from the perceived threats these groups pose. 
Vigilante terrorism thrives when people believe that the government is 
inadequately performing its functions, especially its obligation to protect its 
constituency from this group’s perceived threats, and to make and enforce 
the laws necessary to establish order.52  Usually, in the name of self-defense, 
vigilantes see themselves as enforcers of the law and executioners of justice, 
something that often carries high social appeal in situations and areas that 
are in fact facing problems due to governmental negligence or 
 
 48. See id. at 66–67 (describing the protests of the Weathermen in Chicago). 
 49. Id. at 82. 
 50. Id. 
 51. See e.g. Sprinzak, supra note 44, at 64 (noting that the violence of the Nazi SA and SS and of 
the KKK was not directed against the regime but against specific individuals). 
 52. Sprinzak, supra note 10, at 29–31. 
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incompetence.53  Though vigilantism is “by no means [always] synonymous 
with terrorism,” and vigilantes do not always resort to terrorist activities in 
order to pursue their goals,54 certain vigilante groups, whether as a matter of 
consistent policy or action, do resort to acts that could plausibly amount to 
terrorist activity.  Thus, a thin line demarcates certain types of vigilante acts 
from terrorism, and we must examine whether a given activity crosses the 
line on a case-by-case basis.  However, when authorities fail to respond to 
such vigilante attacks as terrorism, this failure may dangerously fray the 
fabric of society and further delegitimize the status quo.55 
C. The Definition and Scope of Terrorism and Terrorist Activity 
According to social constructivism, social conditions shape agents and 
social structures.56 Conversely, agents and social structures also shape social 
conditions.57  Terror is a subjective condition of fear for one’s personal well-
being irrespective of the source of the fear.  Insofar as terror takes place in 
institutional settings it is bound to be a social phenomenon.58  Terrorism is a 
derivative of the social condition of terror when a specifiable agent inflicts 
it to an individual or a group.  But the co-constitution of agents and structures 
implies that terrorism is bound to be what we say it is through our social 
action and interaction with terrorist activities.  It equally implies that 
identifiable agents also contribute to the making of what terror and terrorism 
are as they form parts of social structures.  Finally, it denotes that identifiable 
social structures are the ones that confer the power to agents in order to 
engage in or disengage from acts of terrorism.59  The complexity of terrorism 
as a derivative of social structures coupled with its often-politicized nature 
has made it particularly difficult to reach a consistent definition both in the 
 
 53. See H. Jon Rosenbaum & Peter C. Sederberg, Vigilantism: An Analysis of Establishment 
Violence, 6 COMP. POL. 541, 550 (1974) (noting instances where vigilantes targeted drug traffickers due 
to distrust in the government’s ability to act). 
 54. Sprinzak, supra note 10, at 29. 
 55. See Benjamin Ward, Divided We Fall: Intolerance in Europe Puts Rights at Risk, HUMAN 
RIGHTS WATCH, (Feb. 14, 2013), https://www.hrw.org/news/2013/02/14/divided-we-fall-intolerance-
europe-puts-rights-risk (discussing the widespread violence against perceived outsiders by extremist 
groups in Europe). 
 56. See generally Bourdieu, Pierre and Richard Nice. 1977. Outline of a theory of practice. Vol. 16; 
PIERRE BOURDIEU ET AL., THE CRAFT OF SOCIOLOGY. EPISTEMOLOGICAL PRELIMINARIES. (Beate Krais 
ed., 1991); JOSÉ LÓPEZ & JOHN SCOTT, SOCIAL STRUCTURE (2000); Porpora, Douglas. “Social Structure: 
e future of a Concept”. In Sing Chew & David Knottneurs (Ed.), Structure, culture and history: recent 
issues in social theory. Boston: Rowman & Little eld, (2002): 43-62; JACQUES RANCIÈRE, 
DISAGREEMENT. POLITICS AND PHILOSOPHY (1999). 
 57. Nicholas Onuf, Making Terror/ism, 23 INT’L REL. 53, 54 (2009). 
 58. Id. at 53. 
 59. Id. at 54. 
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domestic as well as the international contexts.60   This section will give an 
overview of the legislative actions in the EU in relation to the criminalization 
of terrorism and terrorist activities.  It will then analyze the legal 
requirements for the qualification of an offence as terrorist under the existing 
legal frameworks. 
Progressively, we understand terrorism as ranging from threatening or 
infringing upon the individual right to life and personal inviolability to the 
destruction of public and private property, rendering efforts to establish a 
definition and a comprehensive framework for its criminalization rather 
difficult.  The first efforts to systematically suppress “terrorism” in Europe 
go back to the Council of Europe, under the European Convention on the 
Suppression of Terrorism of 1977.  One of the purposes of this Convention 
was to separate political offences from violent acts that were triggered by 
political motive, which it addressed through the listing of a series of acts 
labeled as terrorist offences.61  Inasmuch as the European Convention 
addressed a series of terrorist acts, it shied away from offering a definitive 
definition of terrorism as a crime.  The 2001 terrorist attacks on the U.S. 
promulgated the revision of the Convention extending several of these acts 
and their scope.62  The later Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism of 
2005 by the Council of Europe included a more elaborate listing and 
description of acts that constitute terrorist activity but also failed to offer a 
conclusive definition of terrorism.63  In a similar vein, the European Council 
and the European Commission issued a proposal followed by a Council 
Framework Decision on combating terrorism with the specific purpose of 
harmonizing Member States’ domestic legislation with regard to terrorist 
 
 60. Ben Saul, Defining ‘Terrorism’ to Protect Human Rights 18 (Fundación para las Relaciones 
Internacionales y el Diálogo Exterior, Working Paper No. 20, 2006). Ben Saul, in his Working Paper for 
FRIDE, after studying several (mostly policy) definitions and taking into account the quality standards 
set for legal definitions, proposed the following definition: “1. Any serious, violent, criminal act intended 
to cause death or serious bodily injury, or to endanger life including by acts against property; 2. where 
committed outside an armed conflict; 3. for a political, ideological, religious or ethnic purpose; and 4. 
where intended to: a. create extreme fear in a person, group or the general public; and b. seriously 
intimidate a population or part of a population; or c. unduly compel a government or an international 
organization to do or to abstain from doing any act. 5. Advocacy, protest, dissent or industrial action 
which is not intended to cause death, serious bodily harm or serious risk to public health or safety does 
not constitute a terrorist act.” 
 61. Council of Europe, European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, Jan. 27, 1977, ETS 
No. 90, art 1 in Table 1 of Appendix I [hereinafter Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism]. 
 62. See Council of Europe, European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, Jan. 27, 1977, 
ETS No. 90, as amended by the 2003 Protocol (“Following the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, 
the Council of Europe undertook a revision of this Convention, in order to enhance its effectiveness.”). 
 63. Council of Europe, Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism, May 16, 2005, CETS No. 196. 
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offenses in accordance with the Treaty of the European Union (TEU).64  This 
Framework Decision was finally replaced by a European Parliament and 
Council Directive issued in 2017 on combatting terrorism with an 
implementation deadline for Member States on September 8, 2018.65 
Under the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), 
Directives are a form of EU legislation used as a tool of harmonization of 
Member States’ substantive law.66  Directives allow Member States certain 
discretion in terms of the means they will choose to implement directives 
into domestic law. The Directive on combating terrorism is aimed at 
providing a uniform legal framework across EU Member States for the 
prosecution of individuals responsible for terrorist activity.67  It is, therefore, 
the central legal instrument of the EU’s battle against both domestic and 
international terrorism on the basis of a common definition of terrorist 
offenses and establishing means for Member States to cooperate in 
prosecuting them. 
Attempting to institute a common definition for terrorist activity within 
the EU, the Directive distinguishes two distinct types of offenses: terrorist 
offenses,68 and offenses relating to a terrorist group.69  Article 3 of the 
Directive provides an extensive list of terrorist offenses for the 
criminalization under national law due to their potential to seriously damage 
a country or an international organization (IO).70  The Directive also includes 
an element of intent for terrorist activities requiring that the perpetrator aim 
at “i) seriously intimidating a population, ii) unduly compelling a 
Government or IO to perform or abstain from performing an act, or iii) 
seriously destabilizing or destroying the fundamental political, 
constitutional, economic or social structures of a country or an international 
organization.”71 
The most contested element of Article 3 is what has become known as 
the requirement of endangerment.  The question of whether the provision in 
 
 64. Tamar Meisels, Defining terrorism – a typology, 12 CRITICAL REV. OF INT’L SOC. & POL. PHIL. 
331, 331–51 (2009). 
 65. Directive 2017/541 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2017 on 
Combating Terrorism and Replacing Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA and Amending 
Council Decision 2005/671/JHA, 2017 O.J. (L 88) 6. 
 66. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art. 288, May 9 
2008, 2008 O.J. (C115) 47. 
 67. Directive 2017/541, Preamble, supra note 65. 
 68. Id. art 3. 
 69. Id. art 4. 
 70. Id. art. 3. 
 71. Elisabeth Symeonidou-Kastanidou, Defining Terrorism, 12 EUR. J. CRIM. L. & CRIM. JUST. 14, 
24 (2004). 
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Article 3, “which, given their nature or context, may seriously damage a 
country or an international organization,” should be regarded as an objective 
requirement for qualifying an act as a terrorist offense has been heavily 
debated since the inclusion of the same wording in the earlier Framework 
Decision.72  Interpreting endangerment as an objective requirement would 
essentially suggest that, in order for a certain activity to be qualified as 
terrorism, one must assess the given circumstances in which it took place 
and the extent and seriousness of damage caused or threatened to a country 
or IO.  This requirement of endangerment is essentially what distinguishes 
terrorist and non-terrorist criminal behavior.  However, whether the 
Framework Decision and Directive drafters intended for this element to be 
an objective element is unclear.  The English text gives little guidance as to 
the nature of the second element.73  In the German and Dutch versions of the 
text, the phrase could be understood as a dependent subordinate clause to the 
first requirement and not as a separate requirement.74  Under this 
interpretation, all acts listed in Article 3 are intrinsically so grave that they 
may seriously damage a country or IO provided that all other elements are 
met.75   In this light, this element would not be considered an objective one 
in qualifying punishable behavior as terroristic.  Thus, examination of the 
text in its different languages provides conflicting interpretations with none 
being authoritative. 
These different and conflicting approaches yield two possible ways of 
qualifying a criminal act as terrorism.  First, if the endangerment element of 
Article 3 of the Directive is understood as an objective element, this would 
essentially mean that a punishable offense could be committed with terrorist 
intent but would not qualify as a terrorist offense if the degree of 
endangerment threatened or caused did not cross the threshold of seriously 
damaging a country or ΙΟ.  However, this first objective interpretation begs 
the question of whether the endangerment requirement was intended to be so 
strictly construed that it would be applicable only to the most heinous and 
dangerous acts.  There is nothing to suggest that such a limited scope should 
 
 72. Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA of 13 June 2012 on Combating Terrorism 2002 
O.J. (L 164) 3, 4; European Union: Council of the European Union, Council Framework Decision 
2002/475 on Combating Terrorism (June 13, 2002), 2002/475/JHA. See, e.g., Symeonidou-Kastanidou, 
supra note 71, at 26; Sussanne Voigt, Der EU-Rahmenbeschluss zur Terrorismusbekämpfung – ein 
wirksames Mittel der Terrorabwehr, in DIE EUROPÄISCHE UNION IM KAMPF GEGEN DEN TERRORISMUS: 
SICHERHEIT VS. FREIHEIT? 201, 225 (Erwin Müller & Patricia Schneider eds., 2006). 
 73. Directive 2017/541, art. 3, supra note 65. 
 74. Id. 
 75. See Thomas Weigend, The Universal Terrorist: The International Community Grappling with 
a Definition, 4 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 912, 928–32 (2006) (discussing the problem of defining terrorism 
and interpreting the laws that address it).  
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be attributed to the Directive, or the earlier Framework Decision, especially 
given that what constitutes “serious damage” is in itself unclear.76  Realizing 
the drafting ambiguity, Weigend attempted to provide a different 
explanation, arguing that a sensible interpretation of this clause might take 
as the point of reference any ‘damage’ on the ability of the state to credibly 
fulfill its main functions of providing basic means of survival and 
infrastructure as well as fundamental public security to its citizens.77 These 
functions can be damaged “through large-scale interference with the 
provision of water, energy, and traffic routes, but also through random 
attacks on individuals, which endangers the state’s ability to provide 
protection for life and limb.”78 
Conversely, opting for a flexible interpretation of the endangerment 
requirement while giving courts the liberty to decide against a certain 
background whether an offense is likely to seriously damage a country or an 
IO could create a more viable framework for assessing the nature of said 
offense.79  The existence or absence of terrorist intent can be incorporated as 
the criterion determining the terrorist nature of an offense.  In this light, the 
endangerment criterion still remains relevant to the extent that it is 
incorporated in the categories of behavior listed in Article 3, which 
themselves are understood to cause serious damage to a country or an IO.   
Under this reading, it is the perpetrator’s intent that becomes the decisive 
point of determining the qualification of the offense as terroristic. 
Despite the obvious difference between these two approaches, there is 
also a certain degree of cohesion between them.  In interpreting the 
requirement of endangerment, it is imperative that terrorist intent be taken 
into consideration.  Similarly, the existence of terrorist intent may be inferred 
from the objective nature of the offense itself, making it the decisive factor.  
While the one approach is objective and the other subjective, they both 
indicate that a strictly narrow interpretation of the endangerment requirement 
as an objective element runs counter to the aims of the Directive as a whole 
and the construction of Article 3. 
 
 76. Matthias J. Borgers, Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism: Two Questions on the 
Definition of Terrorist Offences, 1 NEW J. EUR. CRIM. L. 68, 72 (2012). 
 77. Weigend, supra note 75, at 930 n.79. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Borgers, supra note 76, at 73. 
BANTEKA(DO NOT DELETE) 2/5/2019  1:31 PM 
2019] THE RISE OF THE EXTREME RIGHT AND THE CRIME OF TERRORISM 143 
PART II 
A. Political Parties & Terrorism 
Historically, terrorism linked to political parties was exemplified by the 
fascist and Nazi politics of the interwar era.  For these parties in Europe, a 
sine qua non condition of existence was the “incorporation of paramilitary 
units specializing in the use of violence against” perceived threats to the 
party.80  Though such paramilitary groups were definitely violent, it is 
questionable whether their violence would amount to terrorist activity under 
today’s vague and restrictive legal standards. However, such groups 
commonly carried out semi-clandestine “punitive expeditions” against 
symbolic political targets in order to intimidate and terrorize not only the 
immediate victim but also a much wider audience, which this target 
represented.  Some went on to describe and analyze these operations as 
terrorist.81 
Generally, political parties and terrorist groups stand on the extreme, 
opposite ends of the spectrum.  Political theorists conceive political parties 
to be integral to democracy, playing an indispensable role in the democratic 
political process.82  Democracy operates through political parties because 
they grant citizens the opportunity to influence and participate in political 
life.  Political parties also facilitate checks and balances within the 
government because they can be held accountable by the public for the way 
they perform their political acts and duties.83  On the other hand, terrorist 
organizations are defined on the basis of unjustified, often unaccountable and 
illegal violence directed against the government or individual members of 
the public.  Instead of engaging in the logic of persuasion, usually conveyed 
by political parties, they operate under the logic of coercion, which they 
employ to meet their ideological or pragmatic goals.   If political parties are 
 
 80.  LEONARD WEINBERG & AMI PEDAHZUR, POLITICAL PARTIES AND TERRORIST GROUPS 12 
(Roger Eatwell & Cas Mudde eds., 2003). 
 81.  Id. 
 82.  See Richard Gunther & Larry Diamond, Types and Functions of Parties, in POLITICAL PARTIES 
AND DEMOCRACY 3, 7–9 (Larry Diamond & Richard Gunther eds., 2001) (describing the functions of 
political parties); S. C. Stokes, Political Parties and Democracy, 2 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 243, 263–64 
(1999) (discussing political parties as an “unavoidable” aspect of democracy). See generally RUSSEL J. 
DALTON ET AL., POLITICAL PARTIES AND DEMOCRATIC LINKAGE: HOW PARTIES ORGANIZE 
DEMOCRACY (Hans-Dieter Klingemann & Ian McAllister eds., 2011). 
 83.  See ALAN WARE, CITIZENS, PARTIES AND THE STATE: A REAPPRAISAL 184–214 (1988) 
(discussing the power wielded by political parties); Wolfgang C. Müller, Political Parties in 
Parliamentary Democracies: Making Delegation and Accountability Work, 37 EUR. J. POL. RES. 309, 
329–31 (2000) (noting the institutional checks within political parties); Kaare Strøm, Delegation and 
Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies, 37 EUR. J. POL. RES. 261, 272–82 (2000) (discussing the 
oversight mechanisms in parliamentary democracies). 
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the ones constituting democracy, then terrorist groups are the ones 
attempting to tear it apart.84 
Nonetheless, this distinction becomes blurry when these two forms of 
political organization operate under questionable and problematic — for 
democracy’s sake — circumstances, where the legitimacy of both the entire 
political structure, as well as of the sub-parties comprising it, is questioned 
both by the circumstances and by the people.  Under such circumstances, the 
roles may reverse.85  In times when organizations that were marginalized in 
the past for their recurring use of violence and terrorizing activity take on 
mainstream roles and even rise to the form of political parties, they call into 
question the legitimacy of the political structure itself.  Commonly, political 
parties become involved in terrorist activity when a faction emerges on the 
extremist end and begins perpetrating violence.  Conversely, the party itself 
may be the product of mainstream support it has received in the past as an 
organization whose principal mode of expression was in a specified 
spectrum of violence.86  The group’s methods receive the support of the 
public vote, which deceivingly gives it the impression of legitimization.  This 
further blurs distinctions between political parties and terrorist activities 
when they “take advantage of conflicts and promote terrorism in order to” 
gain popularity and votes.87 
Due to this lack of distinguishability, terrorism ought not to be 
understood as an identity but as an activity.  The fluidity that ordinarily 
characterizes organizational structures, such as groups of people that rely on 
violence as a means of political expression, may often generate different 
identities for the given group at given times.  Terrorist activity may be the 
primary form of operation for a group over a period of time, and it may be 
abandoned and re-employed at a later time when such need arises.  In order 
for a group to be considered as performing terrorist activity, this activity need 
be neither constant and uniform throughout time nor the only weapon in the 
group’s arsenal.  It is possible for a certain group to employ terrorist activities 
in conjunction with mainstream political activity at different levels of 
centralization and diffusion.88 
 
 84. WEINBERG & PEDAHZUR, supra note 80, at 12–13. 
 85. See Thomas Perry Thornton, Terror as a Weapon of Political Agitation, in INTERNAL WAR 71, 
89–95 (Harry Eckstein ed., 1964) (discussing the role of terrorism within a political structure). 
 86. WEINBERG & PEDAHZUR, supra note 80, at 37. 
 87. Id. at 57. 
 88. See generally European Comm’n for Democracy Through Law, Guidelines on Prohibition and 
Dissolution of Political Parties and Analogous Measures, VENICE COMMISSION 8–16 (Jan. 10, 2000), 
https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-INF(2000)001-e. 
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In terms of accountability, the Council of Europe Venice Commission 
for Democracy through the Law has stated that “[a] political party as a whole 
cannot be held responsible for the individual behavior of members not 
authorized by the party,” though it accepts the possibility of constitutional 
bans on openly violent groups.89  Article 17 of the Directive on combatting 
terrorism spells out the liability incurred by legal persons for terrorist activity 
as should be implemented by Member States.90  Under Article 17 of the 
Directive, legal persons shall be held liable for any of the offenses that fall 
under the substantive provisions of Articles 3 to 12 and 14 of the Directive 
committed “for their benefit by any person, acting either individually or as 
part of an organ of the legal person, and having a leading position within the 
legal person” based on power of representation, decision-making authority, 
or authority to exercise control with regards to the legal person.91  As a 
corollary, legal persons shall be held liable when the lack of the above 
supervision or control “has made possible the commission of any of the 
offences referred to in Articles 3 to 12 and 14 [of the Directive] for the 
benefit of that legal person by a person under its authority.”92  While the first 
paragraph creates a particularly high threshold for attribution, the second 
paragraph leaves a much larger margin of appreciation relating to both what 
constitutes a “lack of supervision or control” and its measurability.93  
Through Article 17, the Directive allows potential liability and prosecution 
not only of individuals but also of entities with legal personality, which could 
at times include political parties depending on the constitutional provisions 
of the state in which they operate. 
One of the activities often perpetrated by such extreme right-wing 
entities and often correlated to terrorism is hate crimes.94   Empirical research 
often labels hate crimes as a “close cousin” to terrorism based on a target 
selection that takes place according to a victim’s group identity instead of 
individual behavior, but also based on a desired effect to wreak terror on a 
wider number of individuals beyond those specifically targeted.95  This 
assertion is strengthened through similar empirical findings demonstrating a 
causal relationship between economic conditions, hate crimes, and 
 
 89. See Roger Eatwell, Introduction: The New Extreme Right Challenge, in WESTERN 
DEMOCRACIES AND THE NEW EXTREME RIGHT CHALLENGE 1, 4 (Roger Eatwell & Cas Mudde eds., 
2004) (citing the Council of Europe’s Venice Commission for Democracy through the Law (1999)). 
 90. Council Directive 2017/541, art. 17, 2017 O.J. (L 88) 6, 16. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Alan B. Krueger and Jitka Malečková, Education, Poverty, Political Violence and Terrorism: 
Is There a Causal Connection? 10–13 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 9074, 2002). 
 95. E.g., id. at 4. 
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terrorism.96  Both empirical research and theory have attempted to address 
whether the two crimes that are legally distinct but conceptually overlapping 
have only similarities or whether there is a stricter bond of correlation or 
causation between them.  In some empirical studies, perpetrators of hate 
crimes are seen as having questionable plan-setting, blurry culpability, or as 
lacking the ideological and political affiliation inherent to terrorist activity, 
distinguishing their crimes from the planned nature of terrorist activity and 
its association with ideological or political groups.97  Other studies consider 
terrorism as an “upward crime” involving perpetrators that belong either to 
a lower socioeconomic status than the victim or to a minority group that is 
acting against the majority.98  By contrast, hate crime perpetrators are often 
members of the majority group in society, rendering it a downward crime.99 
These types of distinctions help taxonomize but do not address the question 
of the correct classification of crimes perpetrated in ways that do not 
necessarily fall within mainstream understandings of either hate crimes or 
terrorism. 
Despite the legal and conceptual distinction between terrorism and hate 
crimes, there is an ever-evolving position in both empirical research and 
scholarship arguing that a closer connection between the two exists.  Hate 
crime scholars often assert that the two offenses entail an intrinsic “desire to 
terrorize a broader social group,”100 an argument espoused by the U.S. 
Supreme Court when discussing the constitutionality of hate crime laws in 
Wisconsin v. Mitchell.101  Ethnographic research on neo-Nazi groups has 
explicitly linked hate crimes and terrorism by implementing a theory of 
domestic terrorism in explaining active involvement in extremist right-wing 
 
 96. See Christopher J. Lyons, Community (Dis)Organization and Racially Motivated Crime, 113 
AM. J. SOC. 815, 846–51 (2007) (examining the relationship between community structures and racial 
violence). But see Donald Green et al., Defended Neighborhoods, Integration, and Racially Motivated 
Crime, 104 AM. J. SOC. 372, 394–98 (1998) (determining that there is no link between economic 
conditions and racial violence); Krueger & Malečková, supra note 94, at 10–13 (finding no empirical link 
between economic deprivation and racial strife). 
 97. Helmut Willems et al., Fremdenfeindliche Gerwalt: Eine Analyse von Täterstrukturen und 
Eskalationsprozessen. Forschungsbericht im Auftrag des Bundesministeriums für Frauen (1993); Gary 
LaFree & Laura Dugan, How Does Studying Terrorism Compare to Studying Crime?, in TERRORISM AND 
COUNTER- TERRORISM: CRIMINOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 53, 57–61 (Mathieu DeFlem ed., 2004). 
 98. Donald Black, The Geometry of Terrorism, 22 SOC. THEORY 14, 18–20 (2004); Roberta 
Senechal de la Roche, Collective Violence as Social Control, 11 SOC. F. 97, 100–15 (1996). 
 99. Kathleen Deloughery, Ryan D. King & Victoral Asal, Close Cousins or Distant Relatives? The 
Relationship Between Terrorism and Hate Crime, 58 CRIME & DELINQ. 663, 665 (2012). 
 100. Donald P. Green, Laurence H. McFalls & Jennifer K. Smith, Hate Crime: An Emergent 
Research Agenda, 27 ANN. REV. SOC. 479, 483 (2001). 
 101. 508 U.S. 476 (1993). 
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organizations.102  Certain scholars go even further, asserting that hate crimes 
and terrorism are simply two sides of the same coin and constitute different 
manifestations of the same underlying phenomenon.103  Combining the bias 
motivation of hate crime attacks with the intent of sending a message not 
only to the targeted individuals but also to the group that individual 
represents often allows hate crimes to function as a particular form of 
terrorism.104  This overlapping nature of hate crimes and terrorism becomes 
all the more evident through an examination of the crime of terrorism in the 
European context through the lens of one such political party: Greece’s 
Golden Dawn. 
B. Golden Dawn’s Background 
After the end of the Second World War, the legacy of authoritarianism 
limited the electoral demand for extreme right political groups and parties in 
Europe.105  When and where such groups emerged, they were quickly 
dismissed by mainstream politics and were either absorbed by right-wing 
parties or marginalized to the fringes of the political system.  Despite the 
sporadic successes of extreme right-wing political parties in the past decades, 
not much attention was paid to a potential wave of extreme right resurgence 
taking place in Europe until after the fact.  But the recent increased popularity 
of extreme right parties has escalated with the growing pattern of mounting 
electoral success they have received.  The mainstream wave of these parties 
began with Jean-Marie Le Pen’s French National Front run-off ballot success 
in 2003 and the British National Party seeing unprecedented success in 
electing several councilors since 2001.106  Golden Dawn’s successes in the 
latest consecutive Greek parliamentary elections and Hungary’s Jobbik 
European and Hungarian Parliamentary electoral results followed.107  Most 
 
 102. MARK S. HAMM, AMERICAN SKINHEADS: THE CRIMINOLOGY AND CONTROL OF HATE CRIME 
209–18 (Steven A. Egger ed., 1993). 
 103. Deloughery, King & Asal, supra note 99, at 675–83. 
 104. Gregory M. Herek, Jeanine C. Cogan & J. Roy Gillis, Victim Experiences in Hate Crimes Based 
on Sexual Orientation, 58 J. SOC. ISSUES 319, 336 (2002). 
 105. See ANTONIS A. ELLINAS, THE MEDIA AND THE FAR RIGHT IN WESTERN EUROPE 12–19 (2010) 
(discussing the minor political role of the far right in 1950s Europe); PIERO IGNAZI, EXTREME RIGHT 
PARTIES IN WESTERN EUROPE 196 (2003) (noting the failure of extreme right parties to gain a foothold 
in recently democratized countries); KITSCHELT, supra note 15, at 32–35 (discussing factors and 
coalitions supporting far right parties). 
 106. For a popular account along these lines see CLAIRE STERLING, THE TERROR NETWORK 25–48 
(1981). See also Cas Mudde, The 2014 Hungarian Parliamentary Elections, or How to Craft a 
Constitutional Majority, WASH. POST, Apr. 14, 2014, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-
cage/wp/2014/04/14/the-2014-hungarian-parliamentary-elections-or-how-to-craft-a-constitutional-
majority/ (discussing the recent success of far right political candidates in Hungary). 
 107. Mudde, supra note 106. 
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recently, Marine Le Pen had major success in the 2014 European 
Parliamentary election finishing first and also advancing to the second round 
of the most recent French Presidential elections.108  The Party for Freedom 
in The Netherlands won 20 out of 150 seats in the Parliament,109 the 
Alternative for Germany became the third leading party in the Bundestag,110 
the Austrian People’s Party emerged as the largest in the National Council,111 
and Italy’s Lega Nord obtained its best ever results in the 2018 general 
election.112  The new trend in voters’ psychology of moving away from 
traditional partisan allegiances to being highly influenced by party positions 
on immigration, economic struggle, and law and order, gives space to 
populist claims.  The recent rise in the numbers of ethnic and social 
minorities in Europe, coupled with growing concerns about the future of 
democracy triggered by political delegitimization, have emptied the arsenals 
of mainstream political parties and have created more space for the populist 
extreme right to establish itself.113 
Despite these developments, the electoral success of Golden Dawn in 
Greece took many by surprise.  Before the 2012 Greek elections, Golden 
Dawn received 0.29% of the vote in the 2009 elections, a percentage that 
accounted for an almost negligible number of votes.114  It is therefore 
important, in assessing both its political profile and the reasons why it 
attracted such a large piece of the electoral pie so suddenly, to briefly trace 
the evolution of Golden Dawn. 
People’s Association Golden Dawn or, as ordinarily referred to, Golden 
Dawn, was founded in 1983 by Nikos Michaloliakos, who still serves as the 
leader of the party.115  According to its founding documents, the party is self-
 
 108. Shehab Khan, Marine Le Pen Temporarily Steps down as Front National Leader to Concentrate 
on Presidential Bid, THE INDEPENDENT, Apr. 24, 2017; John Mark & Leila Abboud, Far-Right National 
Front stuns French Elite with EU ‘Earthquake,’ REUTERS, May 25, 2014; Adam Mossiter, Why Macron 
Won: Luck, Skill and France’s Dark History, N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 2017. 
 109. VVD de Grootste, Zwaar vVerlies PvdA, DE TELEGRAAF, March 16, 2017. 
 110. CDU/CSU Remains Strongest Parliamentary Group in the Bundestag Despite Losses, 
DEUTSCHER BUNDESTAG (Oct. 13, 2017), https://www.bundestag.de/en/documents /textarchive/election-
2017/527284. 
 111. Noah Barkin, What Austria’s Election Says About Europe’s Political Landscape, REUTERS, Oct. 
15, 2017. 
 112. Alessandro Sala, Elezioni 2018, i Risultati: M5S Primo Partito, nel Centrodestra la Lega 
Supera FI – Lo Spoglio in Tempo Reale, L’ITALIA AL VOTO, Mar. 4, 2018. 
 113. Eatwell, supra note 89, at 3. 
 114. Antonis A. Ellinas, The Rise of Golden Dawn: The New Face of the Far Right in Greece, 18 
SOUTH EUR. SOC’Y & POL. 543, 548 (2013). 
 115. Id. at 547. 
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declared to base its “faith on the ideology of nationalism.”116  The party’s 
flag is black, red, and white, like that of the original Nazi Party of Germany, 
with a swastika-like emblem at the center, which Golden Dawn claims is the 
symbol of the Greek meander. For about a decade after its creation, the party 
remained inactive.  It seized upon the opportunity to reemerge in 1993 amidst 
the nationalist fervor undertaking Greece over the naming dispute between 
Greece and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM).117  
Through the 1980s, Golden Dawn openly flirted with ideas of national 
socialism and fascism.118  In the 1990s they decided to ideologically side 
with popular nationalism and to avoid explicit reference to interwar 
ideologies as much as possible.119  Nevertheless, Golden Dawn’s manifesto 
calls for the creation of a People’s Nationalist State, which does “not ignore 
the law of diversity and difference in nature” and asserts that “[b]y respecting 
the spiritual, ethnic and racial inequality of humans we can build equity and 
law in society.”120  Golden Dawn used to be synonymous with violent attacks 
against minorities across the board that led to social marginalization of the 
party.  Golden Dawn received hardly any support throughout the 1990s and 
until the few most recent general elections in Greece it remained a fringe 
group.121 
In 1998, Antonios Androutsopoulos, the party’s number two in the 
leadership, was convicted and sentenced to 21 years in prison for attempted 
murder against three left-wing students.122  Golden Dawn briefly suspended 
its operations and remained under the radar until the 2009 European and 
national elections where it received 0.46% and 0.29% of the votes 
respectively.  The first electoral success of Golden Dawn came in 2010 in 
the municipal elections shortly after the aftershocks of the financial crisis 
began in Greece.  There, Golden Dawn’s leader received a surprising 5.29% 
of the vote and a seat on the Athens city council.123  Two years later, in its 
campaign for the 2012 general elections, Golden Dawn not only openly 
 
 116. Golden Dawn, Katastatiko Toy Politikoy Kommatos me Tēn Epōnymia “Laïkos Syndesmos 
Chrysē Aygē,” [Statutes of the Political Party with the name “Popular Association - Golden Dawn”], art. 
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 117. See generally Tauόtηta, CHRYSĒ AYGĒ, www.xryshaygh.com/kinima (last visited Oct. 5, 2018) 
(discussing Golden Dawn’s rise in Greece). 
 118. Ellinas, supra note 114, at 548. 
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51 (2012). 
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(July 2012), https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/greece0712ForUpload.pdf (citing Tauόtηta, 
CHRYSĒ AYGĒ , www.xryshaygh.com/kinima (last visited June 6, 2012)). 
 121. Ellinas, supra note 114, at 546. 
 122. Psaras, supra note 119, at 84–139. 
 123. Ellinas, supra note 114, at 548. 
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issued threats of violence against parliamentary deputies who opposed its 
policies, but its members were also allegedly involved in numerous violent 
attacks across Greece.124  Though the party officially denies such 
involvement, public incidents of violence, such as Golden Dawn’s 
spokesman assaulting two female politicians on national television during a 
live debate, suggest otherwise.125  Leading up to the 2012 election, Golden 
Dawn campaigned on the slogan, “So we can rid this land of filth,” speaking 
directly and openly about violence against immigrants.  As in the case of 
extreme right parties elsewhere in Europe,126 its original breakthrough 
combined with its growing popularity “became the springboard for [Golden 
Dawn’s twenty-fold electoral growth” in the 2012 and 2015 elections.127 
But to comprehend the factors that generated this hefty realignment of 
the Greek electorate, it is vital to appreciate both the nature of the modern 
Greek political system as well as the effects of the recent financial crisis in 
contributing to a delegitimization of the status quo. The Greek political 
system has long been thought to be in crisis,128 suffering from high levels of 
corruption, a clientele-based election system, and populist trends.129  While 
these longstanding problems of the Greek political system had often been 
identified, they were heavily tolerated and nurtured as they provided a 
predictable way of ‘getting things done’ both on the part of the politicians as 
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 127. Ellinas, supra note 114, at 549. 
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SYSTEÌMATOS? (2008); C. SIMITRIS, DEMOCRACY IN CRISIS? (2007); X. KONTIADES, DEFICIENT 
DEMOCRACY: STATE AND PARTIES IN MODERN GREECE (Sideris, 2009); CHARÄS KASTANIDÄS, KRISÄ 
KAI METARRYTHMISÄ TOU POLITIKOU SYSTÄMATOS (2009); TH. VEREMIS & H. TSOUKAS, THE 
ANATOMY OF CRISIS (Skai Publications, Neo Faliro 2011). 
 129. See Christos Lyrintzis, Political Parties in Post-Junta Greece: A case of ‘Bureaucratic 
Clientelism’?, 7 WEST EUROPEAN  POL. 99, 99–116 (1984) (discussing the development of the Greek 
party system following the junta government in 1974); DIMITRI A. SOTIROPOULOS, POPULISM AND 
BUREAUCRACY: THE CASE OF GREECE UNDER PASOK, 1981-1989 (1996) (discussing trends in Greek 
politics in the 1980s); TAKIS S. PAPPAS, MAKING PARTY DEMOCRACY IN GREECE (1999) (discussing 
Greek political development); Apostolis Papakostas, Why is There no Clientelism in Scandinavia? A 
Comparison of the Swedish and Greek Sequences of Development, in CLIENTELISM, INTERESTS, AND 
DEMOCRATIC REPRESENTATION: THE EUROPEAN EXPERIENCE IN HISTORICAL AND COMPARATIVE 
PERSPECTIVE 31, (Simona Piattoni ed., 2001) (discussing clientelism in Greece in a comparative 
perspective). See generally Mike Featherstone, An Introduction, in GLOBAL CULTURE 1, 1–12 (Mike 
Featherstone ed., 1990) (describing the globalization if culure). 
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well as their constituencies.  All this, until the financial crisis hit and, in an 
abrupt way, forced the political system to face its endemic problems. 
However, financial crisis alone does not explain the rise of Golden 
Dawn. Despite popular belief, right-wing extremism is not necessarily 
bolstered during periods of financial recession, nor is it caused by periods of 
financial recession.130  Commentators and scholars rush to cite Hitler’s 1930 
Weimar Germany as a paradigmatic example of how financial crises lead to 
electoral victories of the extreme right as people abandon rationality and 
resort to radical populism.131  While this is one possible factor, I argue that 
financial crises do not exist in isolation from other sociopolitical conditions 
under which these political parties come to power.  Instead, they occur in 
tandem with sociopolitical issues such as unemployment, intolerance, fear of 
immigration, higher crime rates, and of everything that appears alien. The 
financial crisis is only the tip of the iceberg in a much deeper and 
multidimensional crisis over national identity, culture, and way of life, which 
leads to a conflict and, arguably, a crisis of legitimacy within the political 
system.132 
The Greek political system now finds itself at a crossroads.  The period 
beginning with the end of the military junta in 1974 and the restoration of 
democracy has been defined by a relatively stable bipartisan system that 
secured the country’s path towards membership in the EU, an enhancement 
of civil rights and freedoms, an expansion of the welfare state, and increased 
levels of development and growth.133  On the flip side, this period was also 
characterized by systemic corruption, public administration failures, and a 
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large accumulation of public debt.134  The financial crisis that fully broke out 
in Greece in 2008 generated a political transition reflected in the sudden 
reduction of the two main political parties’, Panhellenic Socialist Movement 
(PASOK) and New Democracy, electoral shares.  The two parties witnessed 
their shares drop from a cumulative average of 80% to an unprecedented low 
of 32% in May 2012, 42% in the repeat elections of June 2012, and 32% in 
September 2015.135  This sudden and vast change in electoral results reflects 
a general sentiment of delegitimization towards democratic institutions.  
Institutions were no longer seen as carriers of public representation but of 
corruption, and radical action was considered necessary to repair them.136  
This mentality and sociopolitical framework has since dominated the 
discourse within the Greek political system.  This shift has allowed direct 
attacks against core democratic institutions and their representatives, but also 
a rupture of the social fabric with a rise of hate crimes against and 
marginalization of minorities, such as immigrants, refugees, and members of 
the LGBT community.137 
This new climate of delegitimization of the Greek political system 
combined with its failure to provide alternative routes of political 
participation explains in part the increased legitimization enjoyed by the 
extreme right and their use of violence as a tool for expression of political 
dissatisfaction. This new political culture manifests itself through the 
mainstreaming and normalization of right-wing extremism within Greek 
society. Golden Dawn was best positioned to reap the benefit of this 
realignment of the Greek political electorate. Being at the margins of 
political culture and far outside parliamentary politics in the past, Golden 
Dawn was able to turn its pariah status into an emblem of political purity and 
desire for a radical transformation of past and present Greek politics.138  
Golden Dawn, a self-identified nationalist party and described as a right-
wing extremist, even fascist, neo-Nazi party, received 7% of the national 
vote and 18 seats in the Parliament during the last election, making it the 
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third largest party represented in the Greek Parliament.139  Golden Dawn won 
votes not only in the large urban centers where its supporters “stage pogroms 
against immigrants and do battle with leftist youths and anarchists” but 
across the country and varying demographics.140  This normalization and 
institutionalization of what until a few years ago was an organization that 
epitomized anti-democratic rhetoric and openly promoted violence as a form 
of political expression showcases how intrinsically linked the partisan 
political system is to micro-social civic culture.141 
To understand the identity of Golden Dawn as a political party, it is 
necessary to look into the party’s official policies as reflected on its position 
documents as well as the public rhetoric and activity it pursues.  In terms of 
its official ideology, Golden Dawn embraces nationalism as “the third major 
ideology of history,” juxtaposing it to communism and liberalism.142  As a 
typical extreme right-wing party, Golden Dawn effectively equates the 
nation with the state and ethnicity with citizenship.  It understands 
democracy to mean “rule of the people, and therefore the society that is 
comprised of people of common origin.”143  Though Golden Dawn firmly 
denies accusations that align it with the interwar period ideologies, it is a 
proponent of a form of biological nationalism very much akin to those of 
fascism and Nazism.  For Golden Dawn, “[n]ationalism sees people not only 
as a numerical entity of individuals but as a qualitative synthesis of people 
with the same biological and spiritual heritage.”144 The establishment of an 
ethnically pure state is not only a goal in itself but will also bring, according 
to Golden Dawn, the “radical renewal of the obsolete and counterfeit social 
values” that will save the nation from national decadence.145  Furthermore, 
Golden Dawn believes that “nationalism is the only absolute and true 
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revolution because it seeks the birth of new ethical, spiritual, social and 
mental values.”146  For that reason, Golden Dawn “is not looking to salvage 
anything from the installed economic and social interests that lead nations, 
peoples and cultures in decline.”147 
Finally, Golden Dawn attacks the “corrupt political establishment” 
which it sees as selling off Greek sovereignty through the series of 
agreements made with the EU and International Monetary Fund to resolve 
the issue of the Greek debt crisis.148  In the ideal nationalist state Golden 
Dawn strives to establish, “political authority belongs to the People, without 
party patrons,” making direct reference to an ideal political system without 
space for political parties or parliamentary democracy.149   On the issue of 
immigration, Golden Dawn has a firm position of demanding the immediate 
deportation of all undocumented immigrants, as well as the criminal 
prosecution of those employing immigrants illegally.150  For Golden Dawn, 
only people of Greek descent ought to have political rights and the rest 
should only have civil rights.151  Party leader Nikos Michaloliakos has made 
it clear that the party’s relationship with democratic politics is only tenuous.  
At a rally where the party supporters chanted, “blood, honor, and Golden 
Dawn”— an adapted Nazi slogan—Michaloliakos declared: “If they want us 
to, we can abandon it at any given moment and take to the streets. . . There, 
they shall see what the Golden Dawn is really about, they will see what battle 
means, they will see what struggle means, they will see what bayonets 
sharpened every night mean.”152 
In terms of mobilization, Golden Dawn and its members are alleged to 
have contributed to the rise of violence against immigrants and anti-
immigrant crime in Greece.153  Perhaps one of the most pressing challenges 
for Greek domestic security is the sudden increase in activity of violent 
extreme right militia-like groups and gangs who target migrants and 
perceived migrants.154  Since 2009, Greece has faced what NGOs have 
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labeled as “the steepest ascent in racist violence in Europe.”155  Within the 
first half of 2011, NGOs in Athens report to have treated at least 500 victims 
of “racist attacks,” the equivalent of hate crimes in the Greek criminal code, 
with more than 200 additional racist attacks recorded between October 2011 
and December 2012.156  In late 2012, the UNHCR called the level of racist 
violence “alarming,” while the US Embassy in Athens went so far as to warn 
US citizens residing in or travelling to Greece of a heightened risk of attack 
for those whose complexion “might have them perceived as foreign 
migrants.”157  While several Golden Dawn candidates and Members of the 
Parliament have been detained by the police and brought to trial for attacks 
against immigrants during ‘cleansing’ operations throughout Athens, the 
party officially denies any direct involvement in these violent incidents.158   
These operations include many organized acts of violence that commonly 
cause serious bodily harm and are typically perpetrated by black-clad 
vigilante groups who identify with the party.159  Golden Dawn’s leader 
Michaloliakos told Human Rights Watch that while “there is no organic 
relationship between Golden Dawn and these groups, we support their 
activities. Not illegal activities, however … [m]any of their members voted 
for us, and members of Golden Dawn belong to these groups, but the crimes 
don’t come from these groups.”160 
The foray into parliamentary politics did not cause Golden Dawn to 
tone down its fierce rhetoric and alleged violent activities, which have since 
escalated.  Golden Dawn’s leading figures are alleged to have taken part in 
violent attacks and persistent accusations have been made that Golden Dawn 
is the mobilizing force behind these attacks.161  Party members have also 
been implicated in specific attacks.  Party Member of Parliament Elias 
Kasidiaris gained worldwide notoriety when he assaulted two female 
political opponents on national television.162  MPs George Germenis, Elias 
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Panagiotaros and Constantinos Barbarousis led a group of Golden Dawn 
members in Rafina and Mesologgi against immigrant merchants.163  After 
forcefully requesting the merchants to verify whether they had permits, the 
Golden Dawn members overturned market stalls with their Greek 
flagpoles.164  Themis Skordeli, one of the three people standing trial for the 
September 2011 stabbing of an Afghan asylum seeker, was on the Golden 
Dawn ballot in the most recent municipal elections but was not elected.165  
Two MPs were detained, along with the daughter of a Golden Dawn leader, 
and questioned by the police in connection with anti-immigrant violence 
during a Golden Dawn rally though they were released without charge.166  
Golden Dawn has distributed flyers outside gay clubs in Athens reading, 
“after the immigrants, you’re next.”167  Finally, following an investigation 
into the murder of Pavlos Fyssas in 2013 by a Golden Dawn supporter, the 
leader and several Golden Dawn MPs were arrested in 2015 on suspicion of 
forming a criminal organization, and are currently awaiting trial.168 
Despite, or perhaps partially because of, these acts of violence, Golden 
Dawn’s popularity is substantial.  Its perceived role in ‘cleaning up’ 
neighborhoods of urban centers that have been settled by immigrants and 
protecting Greek residents from crime is often cited as one of the party’s 
success factors.169  Moreover, in the eyes of its voters and supporters, Golden 
Dawn has assumed some of the social services that have been abandoned by 
the Greek state, which has been in a tumultuous financial situation since 
2008.  Golden Dawn has been reported to provide its supporters with medical 
and legal aid, medication, and security, escorting pensioners to banks to cash 
 
 163. Giannis Papadopoulos, The Raid was Considered a Ceremonial Visit, KATHIMERINI (Nov. 24, 
2014), http://www.kathimerini.gr/793173/interactive/epikairothta/ereynes/h-efodos-kri8hke-e8imoty 
pikh-episkeyh. 
 164. See Griswold, supra note 152, at 23 (“In the town of Rafina, they overturned market stalls 
belonging to anyone who didn’t have white skin.”). 
 165. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 120, at 39. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Griswold, supra note 152, at 23. 
 168.  Helena Smith, Golden Dawn Leader Jailed Ahead of Greek Criminal Trial, THE GUARDIAN 
(Oct. 3, 2013), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/03/golden-dawn-leader-jailed-nikos-
michaloliakos; Helena Smith, Golden Dawn leaders’ trial adjourned until next week. THE GUARDIAN 
(May 7, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/may/07/golden-dawn-leaders-resume-trial-
greece. 
 169. See Liz Alderman, Greek Far Right Hangs a Target on Immigrants, THE NEW YORK TIMES 
(Jul. 10, 2012), https://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/11/world/europe/as-golden-dawn-rises-in-greece-
anti-immigrant-violence-follows.html (discussing growing violence and threats against immigrants and 
the failure of the government to address such attacks). See generally DANIEL TRILLING, LIGHTS IN THE 
DISTANCE: EXILE AND REFUGE AT THE BORDERS OF EUROPE (2018). 
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their pensions in order to prevent muggings.170 A separate section on 
unemployment on Golden Dawn’s website states that the main reason for the 
increasing national unemployment is the large influx of illegal immigrants 
who entered Greece mainly in the 1990s, claiming that “for every foreign 
worker is a Greek unemployed.”171  Unquestionably, Golden Dawn appeals 
to demographics that not only appreciate its “charitable” social activism but 
also support the violent activities its name is allegedly tied to.  While Golden 
Dawn’s presence in the Parliament could offer a disturbing veil of legitimacy 
and even carte blanche over these actions, its activities increasingly flirt with 
those stipulated in the criminal acts sections of the European Framework 
Decision and Directive on combating terrorism as they have been transposed 
in the Greek Criminal Code.172 
C. A Constitutional Ban or Criminal Liability for Terrorist Activity? 
The approach taken throughout Europe in order to stall the growth and 
activities of extreme right-wing organizations espousing Nazi or fascist 
ideologies is to constrain them through the legal and constitutional 
provisions in place.173  European constitutions generally guarantee 
individual, civil, and political rights such as freedom of speech and 
association granting their citizens the necessary space for the exchange of 
ideas, the establishment of necessary unions and organizations, and the 
expression of approval or opposition through public association and 
demonstration.174 These guarantees are also present in the European 
Convention of Human Rights that serves as a supra-constitutional 
umbrella.175  However, contrary to the wide scope of the First Amendment 
in the U.S. Constitution, regarding rights of speech and association, 
European constitutions impose limits on speech and association rights 
through the constitution itself or through specific laws that delineate the 
 
 170. Alexandra Koronaiou & Alexandros Sakellariou, Reflections on ‘Golden Dawn’, Community 
Organizing and Nationalist Solidarity: Helping (Only) Greeks, 48 COMM. DEV. J. 332-338 (2013). 
 171. Id. at 334. 
 172. POINIKOS KODIKAS[P.K.][CRIMINAL CODE] [Greek Penal Code] 187A. 
 173. E.g., GRUNDGESETZ[GG][BASIC LAW], art. 21 para. 2, translation at https://www.gesetze-im-
internet.de/englisch_gg/englisch_gg.html#p0125; Paul Franz, Unconstitutional and Outlawed Political 
Parties: A German-American Comparison, 5 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 51, 56 (1982); Fernando Casal-
Bértoa, Daniela Romée Piccio & Ekaterina Rashkova, Party Law in Comparative Perspective, WORKING 
PAPER SERIES ON THE LEGAL REGULATION OF POLITICAL PARTIES, No. 16 (2012); Peter Niesen, Anti-
extremism, Negative Republicanism, Civic Society: Three Paradigms for Banning Political Parties, Ger. 
L. J. 81, 81-112, 94-97 (2002). 
 174. E.g., BASIC L. FOR THE FED. REPUBLIC OF GER. [CONSTITUTION]; CONSTITUTION OF OCTOBER 
4, 1958 (FR.); THE CONSTITUTION OF THE KINGDOM OF THE NETHERLANDS 2008; CONSTITUTION OF THE 
ITALIAN REPUBLIC. 
 175. Y.B. EUR. CONV. ON H.R., https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Convention_ENG.pdf. 
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boundaries of permissible action.176  What is more, all EU member states 
have enacted laws that prohibit various forms of racism, discrimination, 
incitement to hatred, and racial violence.177 
In a similar vein, EU Member States allow for the possibility of 
constitutional bans on Nazi or fascist parties.  All states in Germany had all 
agreed in an attempt to ban the National Democratic Party, accused of having 
neo-Nazi links in 2003 and 2017.178  The European Commission against 
racism and intolerance of the Council of Europe has recommended that 
Greece consider banning Golden Dawn.179 However, despite the 
understandable temptation to ban extremist political parties, such a decision 
would not come without consequences.  It raises obvious issues regarding 
balanced restrictions on freedom of speech as well as political assembly and 
participation. Banning such political parties may do little to change the minds 
of these parties’ supporters or decrease their influence.  If anything, a ban 
could drive such parties underground, giving them much more space for the 
pursuit of illegal and violent activities, and could end up strengthening the 
fanaticism of their supporters. It could plausibly further increase the 
attractiveness of violence as a form of political expression if the party is no 
longer given the opportunity to participate in democratic politics and 
peaceful alternatives to violence.180  Instead, if the party is not banned from 
political participation, Golden Dawn political leaders involved in criminal 
activity could have their parliamentary immunity withdrawn, where 
appropriate, for individual prosecutions to take place.  While it is certainly 
debatable how effective such prosecutions would be in addressing the threats 
of violence and terror by members and supporters, this does not mean that 
prosecutions are an ineffective tool for addressing such incidents. It may also 
be necessary to implement additional special measures or restrictions that 
would facilitate effective prosecutions and to sanction any unconstitutional 
 
 176. Banning the NPD: German Governors Agree on Legal Challenge, SPIEGEL ONLINE, Dec. 6, 
2012, http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/german-governors-agree-on-legal-bid-to-ban-far-
right-npd-party-a-871440.html. 
 177. Council of Eur., Anti-Racism Monitors Urge Action against Greece’s Neo-Nazi Golden Dawn 
Party (Dec. 11, 2012), http://www.humanrightseurope.org/2012/12/anti-racism-monitors-urge-action-
against-greece%E2%80%99s-neo-nazi-golden-dawn-party. 
 178. Melissa Eddy, German Court Rejects Effort to Ban Neo-Nazi Party, N.Y. TIMES, (Jan. 17, 
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/17/world/europe/german-court-far-right.html. 
 179. Leaked Council of Europe Report Suggests Greece Could Ban Golden Dawn, EKATHIMERINI 
(Apr. 15, 2013), http://www.ekathimerini.com/4dcgi/_w_articles_wsite1_1_15/04/2013_493932. 
 180. See Bert Klandermans & Nonna Mayer, Context, alliances and conflict, in EXTREME RIGHT 
ACTIVISTS IN EUROPE 28, 30–31 (Bert Klandermans & Nonna Mayer eds., 2006) (discussing the political 
opportunities of extreme right parties). 
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speech or activities and expressions of terror and hostility on behalf of the 
party.181 
Golden Dawn is a party whose members dress in black and use rhetoric 
of violence and imagery that is reminiscent of Nazism and fascism while 
being openly skeptical about parliamentary democracy.  The party publicly 
expresses opinions of racism, anti-Semitism, and homophobia.  But is this 
enough to make the argument that Golden Dawn performs terrorist 
activities?  For Golden Dawn’s activities to qualify as criminal terrorist 
activities in accordance with Article 3 of the Directive on combating 
terrorism, Golden Dawn needs to be recognized as a legal person and its 
attributed activities must align with those enumerated in the Directive as it 
has been transposed in Greek criminal law.182 For purposes of 
harmonization, Greece has implemented the provisions of the earlier 
Framework Decision in Article 187A of the Greek Criminal Code.183 
Human Rights NGOs have long campaigned for the Greek state to 
recognize and treat extreme right-wing violence as a danger to security and 
public safety.  Nonetheless, public officials have, for the most part, rejected 
the idea that such violence is a serious problem despite the growing number 
of incidents reported by NGOs. They have failed to monitor and effectively 
address such attacks by arresting and prosecuting perpetrators or by 
compensating victims.184  It was not until NGOs drew international attention 
to extreme right-wing violence in Greece in the global media that the Greek 
state appointed a special prosecutor in January 2013 to deal with these 
crimes.185  On the Athenian streets however, it is now common knowledge 
among Greeks and immigrants alike that black clothes are the unofficial 
uniform of Golden Dawn.  Some of the violent acts have been captured on 
video and have conveniently been posted on Golden Dawn’s official 
YouTube channel, thus confirming the reported attacks from NGOs.186 
Unquestionably, many of the acts attributed to Golden Dawn could 
serve the aim of threatening or seriously intimidating a population and are 
often attacks against a person’s life as well as physical integrity, thus meeting 
the intent requirement of terrorism under the Directive.187  Under the flexible 
interpretation of the endangerment explained above, the acts listed in Article 
 
 181. See id. at 33 (discussing the politial legal environment in European countries). 
 182. See Directive 2017/541, supra note 65, art. 3 (defining “terrorist offences” under the Directive). 
 183. Poinikos Kodikas [PK] [Penal Code] 187A (Greece). 
 184.  Sappho Xenakis, Violent Extremism in Greece: Focusing on the Far-Right, OPEN DEMOCRACY 
(Mar. 26, 2013), http://www.opendemocracy.net/sappho-xenakis/violent-extremism-in-greece-focusing-
on-far-right. 
 185. Id. 
 186. Griswold, supra note 152, at 22. 
 187. Directive 2017/541, supra note 65, art. 3. 
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3 of the Directive are inherently able to seriously damage a country or go 
against a state’s ability to provide protection for life and limb towards its 
citizens.188 The perpetrator’s intent represents the decisive point in 
determining whether an offense may be qualified as terrorism, which ought 
to be determined by a court in order to establish criminal liability.  To do so, 
a court would first have to decide whether political parties have legal 
personality in order to incur criminal liability for terrorist offenses.  Under 
Greek Constitutional Law, there is no concrete definition for either the form 
or actions of a political party but only a general legal framework within 
which the political party ought to serve the democratic regime.189 
Greek scholarship and jurisprudence are divided over the issue of 
whether political parties have legal personality.  Dominant jurisprudence 
holds that political parties are not legal persons but instead public law 
institutions subject to special rights, responsibilities and action through their 
organs.190  This is because legal persons under Greek law are only those that 
become so after a specific typical procedure as is required by law.191  No 
such provision can be found in either constitutional or civil law to support 
the existence of legal personality for political parties.   Additionally, a 
combination of historic and teleological interpretation of the Greek 
Constitution shows that the legislature, under the shadow of the 1974 
military junta, intended to entrust political parties with as much freedom of 
organization and activity as possible.  Any additional legal provision 
imposing specific procedures of organization and activity would infringe 
upon such freedom.  Under this understanding, political parties are neither 
legal persons nor simple unions but instead sui generis political institutions 
subject to specific rights and responsibilities under public law that attach to 
the goal of their original establishment as contributors to the democratic 
regime. 
Against this dominant theory, the argument has been raised that 
political parties are, in fact, legal persons. First, this argument interprets 
Article 29 of the Greek Constitution in conjunction with other Constitutional 
and legal provisions as specifying a procedure for the acquisition of legal 
personality by political parties.192  Accordingly, Article 72 of the 
Constitution proscribes the procedure for the adoption of a law regarding the 
 
 188. See id. (listing acts that constitute terrorist offenses, including “attacks upon a person’s life 
which may cause death” and “interfering with or disrupting the supply of water, power or any other 
fundamental natural resource, the effect of which is to endanger human life”). 
 189. 2008 Syntagma [Syn.] [Constitution] 3 (Greece). 
 190. 2145/79 STE decision, 600. 
 191. Astikos Kodikas [A.K.] [Civil Code] 4:61 (Greece). 
 192. See 2008 Syntagma [Syn.] [Constitution] 2, 3 (Greece); Diatagma (1974:59) Presidential 
Decree, art. 1 (Greece); Diatagma (1974:650) Presidential Decree, art. 3, 34, 37 (Greece). 
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operation of political parties.193  Additionally, under Greek law, political 
parties may not undertake any activity until the deposition by the leader of 
the party to the Supreme Court of Greece declaring the party’s opposition to 
any act that could overturn the democratic regime or reflect violent 
acquisition of power.194  This procedure could indeed be seen as establishing 
a process similar to the acquisition of legal personality or it could merely be 
interpreted as a guarantor framework for Article 29 of the Constitution, 
which establishes the procedures for establishment and organization of 
political parties.195  Similarly, other legal procedures refer to political parties’ 
obligations to declare their name and emblem to the President of the 
Parliament as well as the Supreme Court in order to be given permission to 
partake in upcoming elections.196  As a political party may not merely be a 
union, the principles of procedural safeguards could dictate the necessity for 
political parties to bear legal personality. 
Second, this argument is also based on the original silence of the 
Constitution regarding the legal nature of political parties.  Accordingly, this 
silence is not to be interpreted as purposely avoiding a strict legal framework 
but instead as foreseeing the need for progressive development of the notion 
of political party in order to enjoy legally guaranteed structures for its 
activities not only in the field of public law but also in private law.  Naturally, 
this institutional framework could not interfere with the political parties’ 
freedom of action toward their democratic goals, but so long as there is no 
infringement on this freedom, political parties ought to enjoy legal 
personality.  Until the issue is clarified through constitutional amendment or 
law, the potential liability of political parties for terrorist activity as 
prescribed by Article 3 of the Directive on combating terrorism currently 
remains only an argument of speculation. 
If we were to assume, arguendo, that political parties indeed enjoy legal 
personality, then provided the act in question meets the definitional 
requirements, a test of attribution would be necessary in order to link the act 
to the political party.  Naturally, the level of attribution is dependent on the 
potential perpetrator and his or her level of active contribution towards the 
party in order to satisfy the first attribution element of Article 17 of the 
 
 193. 2008 Syntagma [Syn.] [Constitution] 3 (Greece) 
 194. Diatagma (1974:59) Presidential Decree, art. 2 (Greece). 
 195. 2008 Syntagma [Syn.] [Constitution] 2 (Greece). 
 196. See, e.g., Andrew Marszal, Golden Dawn Free to Appear on European Parliament Election 
Ballots in Greece, TELEGRAPH, (May 11, 2014), https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/ 
europe/greece/10823857/Golden-Dawn-free-to-appear-on-European-Parliament-election-ballots-in-
Greece.html (discussing the Greek Supreme Court’s decision to recognize Golden Dawn as a political 
party). 
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Directive.197  However, under the second attribution element of Article 17, 
legal persons are also to be held liable by omission, if their lack of 
supervision or control led to the commission of the terrorist act.198  Even if 
the higher attribution standard of direct link could not be met for either 
evidentiary reasons or lack of leadership participation in the act, liability by 
omission could be established.  If political parties were considered to be legal 
persons, activities that fall within the scope of Article 3 of the Directive could 
not only lead to individual liability, but they could also lead to collective 
liability on the part of Golden Dawn as an organization bearing legal 
personality provided the necessary attribution standard is met. 
CONCLUSION 
This article has sought to draw attention to the resurgence of extreme 
right-wing parties and the relationship between right-wing extremism, 
political parties, and terrorism.  In this light, the article set out to substantiate 
three primary claims.  First, it argued that right-wing extremism is the 
product of a delegitimization process against the political status quo. This 
delegitimization created fertile ground for the institutionalization and 
mainstreaming of political organizations reflecting extreme right-wing 
ideologies.  These new or evolved political organizations have a different 
approach and rhetoric towards liberal democracy than their predecessors, 
one that is not directly against it but rather capitalizes on the benefits offered 
by the liberal state to advance their agendas.  Second, this article argued that 
several of the activities of these political organizations may qualify as 
terrorist offenses despite the definitional ambiguity of the crime of terrorism 
using the most recent EU Directive on combatting terrorism, and liberally 
interpreting its endangerment requirement.  Finally, the article focused on 
the illustrative case of Golden Dawn and its association with nationalist 
violence in order to examine a constitutional interpretation that would grant 
political parties in Greece the necessary legal personality in order to incur 
collective criminal liability for such criminal activities. 
Naturally, the issues raised in this article are not only legal but also 
heavily social and political.  However, this article, if nothing else, has 
attempted to shift the discussion from one of descriptive analysis of right-
wing extremism to one of legal evaluation of activities within the ambit of 
the recent criminalization of terrorism.  Continued disregard for the new 
political developments threatening liberal democracy and a lack of a 
systematic approach through the criminal justice system to the criminal and 
 
 197. Directive 2017/541, art. 17, supra note 65. 
 198. Id. 
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terrorizing activities of these political organizations threaten to legitimize 
and perpetuate cultures of violence that can destabilize and delegitimize 
liberal institutions and democratic values. 
 
